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LEGISLATION
UNITED STATES-84TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION-KIDNAPING-
STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION
OF VICTIM.*
Introduction.
In 1932, following the Lindbergh kidnaping, Congress hurriedly
made the interstate transportation of kidnaped persons a federal criminal
offense,' and in 1934, added the rebuttable presumption of such interstate
transportation upon a failure to release the victim within seven days after
the kidnaping.2 The recently adjourned second session of the 84th
Congress has reduced the period to twenty-four hours.3 The presumption
has not yet been tested, but this change may eventually prompt its pres-
entation to the courts and so provide case authority to settle the questions
raised in the succeeding paragraphs. These questions concern the validity
of the presumption as it may be used for the purposes of trial or investi-
gation. Is there a rational connection between the period set and the fact
presumed? What factors might be considered in answering this question?
How could the question be presented? This Comment is directed toward
outlining the answers to these questions, drawing on the indications found
in present case authority, available legislative history, and academic and
professional comment. Neither the Federal Kidnaping Act per se, nor the
subject of presumptions in general will be treated herein, but this is only for
the sake of brevity. Such material is background to the matter below.
I.
THE TEST APPLIED TO PRESUMPTIONS.
Before examining the roles in which this statutory presumption may
appear or be thought valuable, it is convenient to refer to the test to be
applied to it. The justification for this presumption offered by the legis-
lators was that:
"The legality of such a presumption would seem to be fairly
within the rule established by the United States Supreme Court ....
'That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another
(257)
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1952) ; See 75 CONG. REC. 13282-13304 (1932).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (1952).
3. Pub. L. No. 983, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 6, 1956).
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may not constitute a denial of due process or a denial of the equal
protection of the law, it is only essential that there shall be some
rational connection between the fact proved and the fact presumed,
and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be
so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate.' " 4
This is the so-called "rational connection" test, approved and held to be
the only valid test of a statutory presumption in the case of Tot v. United
States.' Other tests of statutory presumptions have been offered,6 but
it is not within the scope of this Comment to discuss them, and, since
the Tot case, it may be considered unnecessary to do so. Here the
standard of Mobile, J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, given pre-eminence
by the Tot case, will be used to examine the validity, and hence the use-
fulness of the provision in question. 7
II.
THE USE OF THE PRESUMPTION.
The original Federal Kidnaping Act predicated federal jurisdiction
on the actual transportation of kidnaped persons in interstate or foreign
commerce." This based government power in such matters squarely on
the "commerce clause" of the Constitution 9 where it has been seen by
the courts to rest rightly and beyond question.10 The purpose of this
presumption is expressly to assume this support for the intervention of
federal authorities in a kidnaping case after the passage of a period of
time.
Accompanying the original seven-day provision was a report stating:
"The purpose of this provision is to clear up borderline cases,
justifying federal investigation in most of such cases and assuring
the validity of federal prosecution in numerous instances in which
4. H.R. Rtp. No. 1457, 73d CONG., 2d Snss. 2 (1934). The report quotes Mobile,
J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910).
5. 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943) : ". . . Under our decisions, a statutory presumption
cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection between the fact proved and the
ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of one from proof of the other is arbitrary
because of lack of connection between the two in common experience." But see Pro-
fessor Morgan's comments in 56 HARV. L. REv. 1324 (1943) and Note, 55 COLUM. L.
Rtv. 527 (1955).
6. Tot v. United States, supra note 5; 4 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1356 (3d ed. 1940,
Supp. 1955).
7. 219 U.S. 35. See note 4 supra.
8. See note 1 supra.
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. There was some opposition in Congress to
this use of the commerce power. 75 CONG. REc. 13282-13304 (1932). See also Finley,
The Lindbergh Law, 28 G~o. L. J. 908 (1939-40) ; 69 U.S.L. REv. 343 (1935).
10. Kelly v. United States, 76 F.2d 847 (1935) ; Bailey v. United States, 74 F.2d
451 (1934) ; cf. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) ; Hoke v. United
States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
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such prosecution would be questionable under the present form of
this act." 11
So, a dual intendment to supply a rebuttable presumptive basis for trial
and investigative jurisdiction in the federal government seems to have
been the original legislative motivation for this provision. A report
accompanying the recent amendment stresses the utility of the presump-
tion for the purposes of the entrance of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion into a kidnaping case; the report also considers its usefulness for trial
purposes as an additional recommendation and, further, suggests that the
shortened span of official federal inactivity will have a greater deterrent
effect. 12
A.
In Prosecutions.
It is the use of the legislative presumption to attach federal jurisdic-
tion in prosecutions for kidnaping that would seem most open to attack.
Yet, it is hard to see how the question could properly be raised. Where
state lines have obviously been crossed, or the United States has in some
other way become involved, 18 the presumption is unnecessary; and where
neither is true and state lines definitely have not been crossed, the act
makes no provision for the entry of the Government, nor does the
Constitution.1 4  So, it is the "borderline" case indeed in which it would
be incumbent upon the defendant to rebut the presumption.'" If there
is no other rebutting evidence or witness, 16 the accused is in a difficult
position. In any case, assuming a plea of not guilty, he must provide
some evidence of an alibi for the period of the presumption. The reason-
ableness of this requirement is helped by the recent amendment, shortening
the time for which the defendant would have to give an account of his
behavior, thus, lightening the defendant's burden 7
11. H.R. REP. No. 1457, 73d CONG., 2d Sass. 2 (1934) (following the language
of S. RaP. No. 534, 73d CONG., 2d Sass., (1934) and a memo from the Department of
Justice quoted therein.)
12. S. RaP. No. 2820, 84th CONG., 2d Snss. (1956).
13. E.g., if the mails have been used, federal jurisdiction may appear under 18
U.S.C. §§ 875-6 (1952).
14. See notes 1 and 9 supra.
15. See 4 WIGMORa, EvIDENCE § 1356 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1955) and 9 WIGMORX,
EvIDaNCF §§ 2490-1 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1955) (constitutionality and legal effect of a
presumption).
16. E.g., testimony of the victim might establish that there was no interstate move-
ment.
17. Still the difficulty may be fatal. The federal courts might require a defendant
to give evidence which will incriminate him in a state prosecution. United States v.
Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931) (tax case). It may be that even where the inference
is a permissible one any unfairness that would result from making the defendant tes-
tify would be fatal to the presumption. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469-470(dictum) (the presumption in question failed the test of rational connection).
LEGISLATION
3
Forde: United States - 84th Congress, 2d Session - Kidnapping - Statutor
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1957
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
That the length of the period of the presumption is important to its
validity may be taken from the history of the amendment of 1934. In that
year the original senate proposal was for a three-day period.'8 The bill
as passed provided for a period of seven days.' 9 This would indicate
that Congress originally thought the longer period more in keeping with
human experience. Although the accompanying reports are silent on the
matter,20 the difference may be referable to the words of the Turnipseed
case quoted in the House Report.2 ' Applying this "rational connection"
test, this time in the words of Tot, may it be said of twenty-four hours
as against the seven days of the previous enactment:
.. .where the inference is so strained as not to have a reason-
able relation to the circumstances of life as we know them, it is not
competent for the legislature to create it as a rule governing the pro-
cedure of the courts." 22
It would seem that this could not be said in the light of today's experience.
The criminal might be fairly supposed to be in flight during the time after
the crime, and it is not unreasonable that within the twenty-four hour
period this flight would put the felon and his victim beyond state lines
though perhaps it cannot be called probable. This is the rationale used
to support the legislative judgment.
But is this enough? Difficulties peculiar to the use of the presumption
in criminal trials are in the objections posed on grounds of the privilege
against self-incrimination, of due process under the Constitution, of the
presumption of innocence, of the right to trial by jury, or that the burden
of proof must remain on the prosecution.3 The tenor of federal decision
seems to be expressed in sum by O'Neill v. United States 24
"The general principle is well recognized that even in criminal
prosecutions, Congress or a state legislature may with certain limita-
tions enact that when certain facts have been proved they shall be
prima facie evidence of the existence of the main fact question. The
limitations are these: There must be some rational connection be-
tween the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed; the inference
of the existence of the ultimate fact from proof of the other fact must
not be so unreasonable or unnatural as to be a purely arbitrary
18. S. REP. No. 534, 73d CONG., 2d SEss. 2 (1934).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(b) (1952).
20. S. REP. No. 534, 73d CONc., 2d SEss. (1934) and H. R. REP. No. 1457, 73d
CONG., 2d SEss. (1934).
21. See note 4 supra.
22. 319 U.S. at 468.
23. A consideration in full of all these objections is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, however, see a partial list of materials on the constitutionality of statutory pre-
sumptions in 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1356 n. 1 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1955). See also
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 473 (concurring opinion).
24. 19 F.2d 322, 327 (1927).
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mandate; and the accused must not be deprived of a proper oppor-
tunity to present his defense to the main fact so presumed and have
the case submitted on all the evidence to the jury for its decision."
(citations omitted)
While this is not a complete answer, it indicates that the courts will defer
to legislative judgment in this area as long as there is some rational connec-
tion and settle all constitutional objections on this basis. The inference
to be made must not only be unreasonable, but so unreasonable as to be
purely arbitrary, before courts will overthrow the presumption. The
Court in the Tot case, with an opportunity to decide on other principles, 25
fell back on the rational connection test. It is unlikely that the Court will
always find this possible and only a little more likely that the Court will
prefer the convenience of the Government above the liberty of the indi-
vidual. If the present presumption be found to have some rational connec-
tion with the facts proven and to be reasonable in other aspects, it is
nonetheless unlikely that the presumption will be found to have any real
trial usefulness for it weighs, heavily upon the accused's constitutional
rights.
B.
In Investigations.
Having discussed the questions of the use of the statutory presump-
tion in prosecutions, there remains a consideration of its position in
justifying an official federal investigation in the "borderline" case. It is
likewise difficult to imagine the situation in which the validity of the
presumption in this context could be directly tested. It is unlikely that
local police would try to prevent federal "interference." 26 Would a
defendant object to the presence of the federal government? It would
serve him no purpose to do so unless he was liable to a greater penalty
under the federal law. Then, of course, the real objection again would be
to a federal trial, involving much the same considerations of rational
connection mentioned above. With no judicial interpretation available,
it seems, by analogy to its use in the trial situation, that the presumption
here, as a key for the government investigator, would be at least as valid.
In this context it would be unfettered by any of the constitutional ob-
jections enumerated above-or for that matter any real opportunity to
present an objection.
Conclusion.
It may be concluded that the recent reduction of the time required
to elapse before the presumption of interstate transportation of a kid-
naping victim will have little effect on the possibility of the device coming
25. See note 17 supra.
26. But remember the state's rights objections to the act as a whole. 75 CoNc.
Rzc. 13283-13304 (1932).
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into question since other considerations intervene to make it unlikely.
The reduction may even aid the presumption insofar as it minimizes the
difficulty of rebutting it. The jurisdiction acquired under this clause is
only necessary in a limited number of cases, and the provision is not
usually involved in the case in such a way that the courts must pass on it.
However, if it were put to the test prescribed by the United States
Supreme Court, the present ability and the historic propensity of the
criminal to flee the state would probably support the reasonableness of
the presumption though it may fall in other areas. The entire appreciable
utility of the provision is apparently limited to its investigatory-inhibitory
possibilities.
George S. Forde, Jr.
* KIDNAPING-STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF INTERSTATE
TRANSPORTATION OF VICTIM
CHAPTER 971, PUBLIC LAW 983
An act to amend section 1201 of title 18 of the United States Code
to authorize the Federal Bureau of Investigation to initiate investigation
of any kidnaping in which the victim has not been released within twenty-
four hours after his seizure.
Be It Enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States in Congress Assembled, That:
Subsection (b) of section 1201 of title 18 of the United States Code
is amended to read as follows:
"(b) The failure to release the victim within twenty-fours after
he shall have been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed,
kidnaped, abducted or carried away shall create a rebuttable presump-
tion that such person has been transported in interstate or foreign
commerce."
Approved August 6, 1956.
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